Here is a list of some research I’ve been undergoing or have collaborated. If you are interested in reading a draft, send me a note here.
Robust Virtue Epistemology and the Anti-Individualist Challenge
Last version: January 2020
It has been argued that John Greco’s virtue reliabilism (2007, 2010, 2012) cannot adequately explain cases in which knowledge is the result of abilities not exercised by the knower (Lackey, 2009, Kallestrup & Pritchard, 2012). While Greco has responded to these objections (2012, 2018), more needs to be said in order to characterize a clear and adequate robust virtue reliabilist theory that can withstand this criticism. In this paper I will explain how precisely Greco’s latest account meets this anti-individualist challenge successfully, while maintaining the commitment to the view that knowledge is a kind of success through ability.
Social Responsibilism and the Internalist/Externalist Debate regarding Epistemic Justification
Last version: January 2017
It has been argued that epistemic justification demands that and agent S should be a responsible agent with respect to her beliefs, in the sense that S ought to form them in an appropriate way from her perspective. Presumably, given this perspectival component, such standard cannot be easily captured by externalist theories, and this presents us with a prima facie motivation to adopt some kind of internalism. This paper analyzes the internalist/externalist debate regarding epistemic justification in reference to these considerations and offers an externalist theory of epistemic responsibility, which considers the features of favorable epistemic environments in which beliefs can be held in a responsible manner. This social approach leads us, in turn, to a better understanding of the notion of epistemic justification that is required for knowledge.