Here is a list of some research I’ve been undergoing or have collaborated. If you are interested in reading a draft, send me a note here.
Robust Virtue Epistemology and the Anti-Individualist Challenge
Last version: January 2020
It has been argued that John Greco’s virtue reliabilism (2007, 2010, 2012) cannot adequately explain cases in which knowledge is the result of abilities not exercised by the knower (Lackey, 2009, Kallestrup & Pritchard, 2012). While Greco has responded to these objections (2012, 2018), more needs to be said in order to characterize a clear and adequate robust virtue reliabilist theory that can withstand this criticism. In this paper I will explain how precisely Greco’s latest account meets this anti-individualist challenge successfully, while maintaining the commitment to the view that knowledge is a kind of success through ability.
The Effect of Valence on Moral Typecasting
With Philip Robbins and Paul Litton (in progress).
Engaging and Effective Office Hours in Philosophy Courses
With Jean Janasz (in progress).
As it is widely acknowledged, discussion is one of the primary learning methods in philosophy. Together with lectures and discussion sessions, office hours constitute a natural extension of this dialog. Among other benefits, they provide students with an opportunity to formulate specific questions directed to address their particular needs, which is especially helpful for students who have difficulty speaking up in class or who are interested in moving beyond the class discussion. However, it remains an open question whether students utilize this resource effectively, since the factors involved in the practice (such as the number and type of students that participate, the methodology employed in each session, and the students’ typical needs expressed in the sessions, to name a few) are unclear and not systematically studied. This research project will help to shed light onto these issues by determining key factors pertaining to the practice of office hours that can lead to greater student success.
Social Responsibilism and the Internalist/Externalist Debate regarding Epistemic Justification
Last version: January 2017
It has been argued that epistemic justification demands that and agent S should be a responsible agent with respect to her beliefs, in the sense that S ought to form them in an appropriate way from her perspective. Presumably, given this perspectival component, such standard cannot be easily captured by externalist theories, and this presents us with a prima facie motivation to adopt some kind of internalism. This paper analyzes the internalist/externalist debate regarding epistemic justification in reference to these considerations and offers an externalist theory of epistemic responsibility, which considers the features of favorable epistemic environments in which beliefs can be held in a responsible manner. This social approach leads us, in turn, to a better understanding of the notion of epistemic justification that is required for knowledge.